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Abstract— Recent years have witnessed widespread adoption
of machine learning (ML)/deep learning (DL) techniques due to
their superior performance for a variety of healthcare applica-
tions ranging from the prediction of cardiac arrest from one-
dimensional heart signals to computer-aided diagnosis (CADx)
using multi-dimensional medical images. Notwithstanding the
impressive performance of ML/DL, there are still lingering
doubts regarding the robustness of ML/DL in healthcare settings
(which is traditionally considered quite challenging due to the
myriad security and privacy issues involved), especially in light
of recent results that have shown that ML/DL are vulnerable
to adversarial attacks. In this paper, we present an overview
of various application areas in healthcare that leverage such
techniques from security and privacy point of view and present
associated challenges. In addition, we present potential methods
to ensure secure and privacy-preserving ML for healthcare
applications. Finally, we provide insight into the current research
challenges and promising directions for future research.
I. INTRODUCTION
We are living in the age of algorithms, in which machine
learning (ML)/deep learning (DL) systems have transformed
multiple industries such as manufacturing, transportation, and
governance. Over the past few years, DL has provided state
of the art performance in different domains—e.g., computer
vision, text analytics, and speech processing, etc. Due to
the extensive deployment of ML/DL algorithms in various
domains (e.g., social media), such technology has become
inseparable from our routine life. ML/DL algorithms are
now beginning to influence healthcare as well—a field that
has traditionally been impervious to large-scale technological
disruptions [1]. ML/DL techniques have shown outstanding
results recently in versatile tasks such as recognition of body
organs from medical images [2], classification of interstitial
lung diseases [3], detection of lungs nodules [4], medical
image reconstruction [5], [6], and brain tumor segmentation
[7], to name a few.
It is highly expected that intelligent software will assist
radiologists and physicians in examining patients in the near
future [8] and ML will revolutionize the medical research and
practice [9]. Clinical medicine has emerged as a exciting appli-
cation area for ML/DL models, and these models have already
achieved human-level performance in clinical pathology [10],
radiology [11], ophthalmology [12], and dermatology [13].
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Some of these studies have even reported that DL models
outperform human physicians on average. The aspect of better
performance of DL models in comparison with humans has led
to the development of computer-aided diagnosis systems—for
instance, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in
2018 has announced the approval of an intelligent diagnosis
system to detect certain diabetes-related eye problems from
medical images that will not require any human intervention.1
The potential of ML models for healthcare applications is
also benefitting from the progress in concomitantly-advancing
technologies like cloud/edge computing, mobile communi-
cation, and big data technology [14]. Together with these
technologies, ML/DL is capable of producing highly accurate
predictive outcomes and can facilitate the human-centered in-
telligent solutions [15]. Along with other benefits like enabling
remote healthcare services for rural and low-income zones,
these technologies can play a vital role in revitalizing the
healthcare industry.
Notwithstanding the impressive performance of DL algo-
rithms, many recent studies have raised concerns about the
security and robustness of ML models—for instance, Szegedy
et al. demonstrated for the first time that DL models are strictly
vulnerable to carefully crafted adversarial examples [20].
Similarly, various types of data and model poisoning attacks
have been proposed against DL systems [21] and different
defenses against such strategies have been proposed in the
literature [19]. However, the robustness of defense methods
is also questionable and different studies have shown that
most of the defense techniques fail against a particular attack.
The discovery of the fact that DL models are neither secure
nor robust hinders significantly their practical deployment in
security-critical applications like predictive healthcare which is
essentially life-critical. For instance, researchers have already
demonstrated the threat of adversarial attacks on ML-based
medical systems [22], [17]. Therefore, ensuring the integrity
and security of DL models and health data are paramount to
the widespread adoption of ML/DL in the industry.
Before moving further, we will elaborate upon the two key
terms on which this survey is focused—namely, security and
robustness—particularly in the context of ML/DL models.
Security is concerned with the possible threats/attacks that
can be realized on an ML/DL system influencing it to get
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TABLE I: Comparison of this paper with existing review and survey papers on secure, private, robust ML/DL for healthcare
applications. (Covered:
√
; Not covered: ×; Partially covered: ≈)
Year Authors Highlights Type
Applications
of ML in
Healthcare
Conventional
Challenges
Privacy
Challenges
Adversarial
ML
Secure &
Private
ML Methods
Solutions for
Adversarial
ML Attacks
Open
Research
Issues
2017 Miotto et
al. [16]
Presented a review of DL applica-
tions in healthcare and the chal-
lenges and imitations in terms of
ease-of-understanding of outcomes
to human experts.
Review ≈ √ ≈ × × × ×
2018 Papangelou
et al. [17]
Provided an understanding of ad-
versarial examples in clinical ap-
plications and introduced the con-
cept of adversarial patients in the
context of counterfactual models in
clinical trials.
Position
Paper
× × × √ × × √
2019 Kim et al.
[18]
Provided a review of different ad-
versarial attacks and defenses with
their applications in ML based
medical image analysis.
Review ≈ × × √ × √ ×
2019 Yuan et al.
[19]
Provides an overview of literature
on adversarial attacks and defenses
in general.
Survey × × × √ × √ ×
2020 Our Paper Presents a comprehensive survey of
various security challenges associ-
ated with the application of ML/DL
in healthcare systems and outlines
robust solutions.
Survey
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
intended behavior or outcome, whereas robustness defines the
capability of the ML/DL system to survive under such attacks.
Security is analyzed along two dimensions: (a) the attacks on
ML/DL systems attempting to get the control of the system
or to get the intended behavior/outcome; (b) the attacks trying
to learn about the training data, i.e., privacy attacks. On the
other hand, robustness is also analyzed along two axes: (a)
the survivability of ML/DL systems under attacks attempting
to influence them (i.e., robustness to attacks like adversarial
ML attacks); (b) the resistance to privacy attacks. Note that
the robustness is a relative term and the effectiveness of the
system varies according to the nature of the attack, i.e., an
ML/DL system might be robust under a particular attack but
vulnerable to a different attack.
In this paper, we present a comprehensive survey of existing
literature on the security and robustness of ML/DL models
when used for building healthcare systems with a specific
focus on the above-mentioned dimensions. We note here that
the aim of this paper is to provide an in-depth survey of
various security challenges associated with the application of
ML/DL in healthcare systems and to provide a taxonomy
of potential solutions to overcome these issues. Along with
discussing security and robustness challenges of using ML/DL
models, we also briefly elaborate on various general challenges
and sources of vulnerabilities that hinder the safe and robust
application of ML/DL in healthcare applications. In addition,
potential solutions to address security, privacy, and robustness
challenges are presented in this paper. In summary, the fol-
lowing are the specific contributions of this paper.
1) We present an overview of diverse literature on ap-
plications of ML/DL techniques by categorizing it to
four major tasks in healthcare, i.e., prognosis, diagnosis,
treatment, and clinical workflow.
2) We formulate the ML pipeline for data-driven healthcare
applications and describe different sources of vulnera-
bilities at each stage that raises security and robustness
challenges.
3) We present an overview of various security and robust-
ness challenges associated with the adoption of ML/DL
models for healthcare applications.
4) We present a taxonomy of different solutions that can
be used for ensuring secure and robust application of
ML/DL techniques for healthcare applications.
5) Finally, we highlight various open research issues that
require further investigation.
A comparison of this paper with existing surveys and review
papers on the security of ML/DL models in healthcare systems
is also presented in Table I.
Organization of the Paper: The rest of the paper is organized
as follows. In Section II, various applications of ML and DL
techniques in healthcare are discussed. Section III presents the
ML pipeline in data-driven healthcare and various sources of
vulnerabilities along with different challenges associated with
the use of ML. Different potential solutions to ensure secure
and privacy-preserving ML are discussed in Section IV and
various open research issues are outlined in Section V. Finally,
we conclude the paper in Section VI.
II. ML FOR HEALTHCARE: APPLICATIONS
In this section, various prominent applications of ML in
healthcare are discussed.
A. ML in Healthcare: The Big Picture
The major phases for developing a ML-based healthcare
system are illustrated in Figure 1 and major types of ML/DL
that can be used in healthcare applications are briefly described
next.
1) Unsupervised Learning: The ML techniques utilizing
unlabelled data are known as unsupervised learning methods.
Widely used examples of unsupervised learning methods are
a clustering of data points using a similarity metric and
dimensionality reduction to project high dimensional data to
lower-dimensional subspaces (sometimes also referred to as
feature selection). In addition, unsupervised learning can be
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Fig. 1: The illustration of major phases for development of machine learning (ML) based healthcare systems.
used for anomaly detection, e.g., clustering [23]. Classical
examples of unsupervised learning methods in healthcare
include the prediction of heart diseases using clustering [24]
and prediction of hepatitis disease using principal component
analysis (PCA) which is a dimensionality reduction technique
[25].
2) Supervised Learning: Such methods that build or map
the association between the inputs and outputs using labeled
training data are characterized as supervised learning methods.
If the output is discrete then the task is called classification
and for a continuous value output, the task is called regres-
sion. Classical examples of supervised learning methods in
healthcare include the classification of different types of lung
diseases (nodules) [4] and recognition of different body organs
from medical images [2]. Sometimes, ML methods can be
neither supervised nor unsupervised, i.e., where the training
data contains both labeled and unlabelled samples. Methods
utilizing such data are known as semi-supervised learning
methods. A systematic review of supervised and unsupervised
learning techniques can be found in [26].
3) Semi-supervised Learning: Semi-supervised learning
methods are useful when both labelled and unlabelled samples
are available for training, typically, a small amount of labelled
data and a large amount of unlabelled data. Semi-supervised
learning techniques can be particularly useful for a variety
of healthcare applications as acquiring a sufficient amount
of labelled data for model training is difficult in healthcare.
Different facets of semi-supervised learning using different
learning techniques have been proposed in the literature. For
instance, a semi-supervised clustering method for healthcare
data is presented in [27] and a semi-supervised ML approach
for activity recognition using sensors data is presented in
[28]. In [29], [30], authors applied a semi-supervised learning
method to medical image segmentation.
4) Reinforcement Learning: Methods that learn a policy
function given a set of observations, actions, and rewards in
response to actions performed over time fall in the class of
reinforcement learning (RL) [31]. RL has a great potential
to transform many healthcare applications and recently, it has
been used for context-aware symptoms checking for disease
diagnosis [32]. Furthermore, the potential of using RL for
healthcare applications can be seen through the recent example
of the Go game, where a computer using RL with the
integration of supervised and unsupervised learning methods
defeated a human champion player [33].
B. Applications of ML in Healthcare
Healthcare service providers generate a large amount of
heterogeneous data and information daily, making it difficult
for the “traditional methods” to analyze and process it. ML/DL
methods help to effectively analyze this data for actionable
insights. In addition, there are heterogeneous sources of data
that can augment healthcare data such as genomics, medical
data, data from social media, and environmental data, etc. A
depiction of these sources of data is shown in Figure 2. The
four major applications of healthcare that can benefit from
ML/DL techniques are prognosis, diagnosis, treatment, and
clinical workflow, which are described next.
1) Applications of ML in Prognosis: Prognosis is the pro-
cess of predicting the expected development of a disease in
clinical practice. It also includes identification of symptoms
and signs related to a specific disease and whether they will
become worse, improve, or remain stable over time and identi-
fication of potential associated health problems, complications,
ability to perform routine activities, and the likelihood of
survival. As in clinical setting, multi-modal patients’ data
is collected, e.g., phenotypic, genomic, proteomic, pathology
tests results, and medical images, etc., which can empower
the ML models to facilitate disease prognosis, diagnosis and
treatment [34]. For instance, ML models have been largely
developed for the identification and classification of different
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Fig. 2: Illustration of heterogeneous sources contributing to
healthcare data.
types of cancers, e.g., brain tumor [35] and lung nodules [36].
However, the potential applications ML for disease progno-
sis, i.e., prediction of disease symptoms, risks, survivability,
and recurrence have been exploited under recent translational
research efforts that aim to enable personalized medicine.
However, the field of personalized medicine is nascent that
requires extensive development of adjacent fields like bioinfor-
matics, strong validation strategies, and demonstrably robust
applications of ML thus to achieve the huge and translational
impact.
2) Applications of ML in Diagnosis:
a) Electronic Health Records (EHRs): Hospitals and
other healthcare service providers are producing a large col-
lection of electronic health records (EHRs) on a daily basis
and comprise of structured and unstructured data that contains
a complete medication history of patients. ML-based methods
have been utilized for the extraction of clinical features for
facilitating the diagnosis process [37]. For example, a semi-
supervised approach for the extraction of diagnosis informa-
tion from unstructured EHRs is presented in [38]. The use
of ML for the diagnosis of diabetes from EHRs is presented
in [39]. In [40], features robustness using EHRs data for the
year of care for each record is examined for two tasks, i.e.,
mortality prediction and length-of-stay and authors showed
that prediction performance gets degraded when ML models
are trained on historical data and tested on unseen (future)
data.
b) ML in Medical Image Analysis: In medical image
analysis, ML techniques are used for efficient and effective ex-
traction of information from medical images that are acquired
using different imaging modalities such as magnetic resonance
imaging (MRI), computed tomography (CT), ultrasound, and
positron emission tomography (PET), etc. These modalities
provide important functional and anatomical information about
different body organs and play a crucial role in the detec-
tion/localization and diagnosis of abnormalities. A taxonomy
of key medical imaging modalities is presented in Figure
3. The key purpose of medical image analysis is to assist
clinicians and radiologists for efficient diagnosis and prognosis
of the diseases. The prominent tasks in medical image analysis
include detection, classification, segmentation, retrieval, recon-
struction, and image registration which are discussed next.
Moreover, fully automated intelligent medical image diagnosis
systems are expected to be part of next-generation healthcare
systems.
• Enhancement: Enhancement of degraded medical images
is an important pre-processing step that directly effects
the diagnosis process. There are many sources of noise
and disturbances encountered in the medical image acqui-
sition process which degrade the quality and significance
of the resultant images. For instance, generating MRI
images is a quite lengthy process that typically requires
several minutes to produce a good quality image and
to acquire detailed soft-tissue contrast, patients have to
remain still and straight as much as possible. Because
movements can cause false artifacts in image acquisi-
tion, the complete process has to be repeated usually
multiple times to produce significantly useful images.
Also, depending on the body area being scanned and the
number of images to be taken, patients might be asked
to hold their breath during short scans [42]. Therefore,
any movement of the subject can introduce artifacts in
the acquired image. Moreover, some sort of mechanical
noise is also sometimes introduced in the output image. In
the literature, different DL models are used for denoising
medical images such as convolutional denoising autoen-
coders [43] and GANs. In addition, GANs have been
successfully used for cleaning motion artifacts introduced
in multi-shot MRI images [14]. Super-resolution is yet
another powerful and impactful enhancement technique
for medical images, e.g., MRI denoising [44].
• Detection: The process of identifying specific disease
patterns or abnormalities (e.g., tumor, cancer) in medical
images is known as detection. In traditional clinical
practice, such abnormalities are identified by expert ra-
diologists or physicians that often require a lot of time
and effort. Whereas, DL based methods have shown their
potential for this task and various studies have been
presented in the literature for the detection of diseases.
For instance, a locality-sensitive approach utilizing CNN
for the detection and classification of nuclei colon cancer
in histopathological images is presented in [45]. A hybrid
method utilizing handcrafted features and a CNN model
for the detection of mitosis in breast cancer images is
presented in [46].
• Classification DL models in particular, convolutional
neural networks (CNNs) have proven to give high per-
formance in medical image classification tasks when
compared with other state-of-the-art non-learning based
techniques. Modality classification, recognizing different
body organs, and abnormalities from medical images
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Fig. 3: A typology of commonly used medical imaging modalities (adapted from [41]).
using CNNs have been extensively studied in the liter-
ature. In [2], an approach using CNN for multi-instance
recognition of different body organs is presented and a
CNN based method for classification of interstitial lung
diseases (ILDs) is presented in [3]. In another study,
a CNN model is trained for the classification of lung
nodules [4].
Transfer learning approaches have also been used for
medical image classification [47]. In transfer learning,
a pre-trained DL model (typically trained on natural
images) is fine-tuned on a comparatively small dataset of
medical images. The results obtained by this approach, as
reported in the literature, are promising; however, a few
studies have reported contradictory results. For instance,
results obtained by transfer learning in [48] and [49] are
contradictory.
• Segmentation: The segmentation of tissues and organs
in medical images enables quantitative analysis of ab-
normalities in terms of clinical parameters, e.g., auto-
matically measuring the volume and shape of cancer in
brain images. In addition, the extraction of such clinically
significant features is an important and foremost step in
computer-aided detection and diagnosis systems that we
discuss later in this section. The process of segmentation
deals with the partitioning of an image into multiple
non-overlapping parts using a pre-defined criterion such
as intrinsic color, texture, and contrast, etc. Addressing
the problem of segmentation utilizing various DL models
(e.g, CNN and recurrent neural network (RNN) [50]) is
widely studied in the literature and the common archi-
tecture used for segmentation of medical images is U-net
[51]. Various DL architectures are being proposed for the
segmentation of multi-modal images such as the brain,
skin cancer, CT images, etc. as well as segmentation
of volumetric images [52]. An overview of various DL
models for segmentation of medical images is presented
in [53].
• Reconstruction: The process of generating interpretable
images from raw data acquired from the imaging sensor is
known as medical image reconstruction. The fundamental
problem in medical image reconstruction is to accelerate
the inherently slow data acquisition process, which is
an interesting ill-posed inverse problem in which we
want to determine the system’s input given its output.
Many important medical imaging modalities require a
lot of time for reconstructing an image from the raw
data samples, e.g., MRI and CT. Thus in medical image
reconstruction, we aim to reduce image acquisition time
and storage space.
Research on medical image reconstruction using deep
models is drastically increasing and various DL models
such as CNNs [54] and autoencoders [6] have been
extensively used for the reconstruction of MRI and
CT images. Recently, generative adversarial networks
(GANs) have been widely used for the reconstruction of
medical images and have produced outstanding results.
For instance, a GAN based MRI reconstruction method
is presented in [55] that also cleans the motion artifacts.
• Image Registration: Image registration is the process of
mapping input images with respect to a reference image
and it is the first step in image fusion. Image registration
has many potential applications in medical image analysis
as described in detail by El-Gamal et al. [56], however,
their use in actual clinical applications is very limited
[57]. To facilitate the surgical spinal screw implant or
tumor removal, image registration is usually applied in
spinal surgery or neurosurgery for the localization of
spinal bony landmark or a tumor, respectively. Various
similarity metrics and reference points are calculated to
align the sensed image with the reference image. In [58],
a framework for deformable image registration named
as Quicksilver is proposed that uses the large deforma-
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tion diffeomorphic metric mapping (LDDMM) model for
patch-wise prediction strategy. Similarly, an unsupervised
learning based methods for deformable image registration
is presented in . In [59], a CNN based regression approach
for 2D/3D image registration is presented that addresses
two fundamental limitations of existing intensity-based
image registration methods, i.e., small capture range and
slow computation.
• Retrieval: The recent era has witnessed the revolution
of digital interventions from the large-scale image and
video collections to big data. This trend is true for
medical imaging as well, every hospital and clinic having
radiology services are producing thousands of medical
images daily in diverse modalities, resulting in the growth
of large-scale multi-modal medical image repositories.
Thus making it difficult to manage and query such
huge databases. In particular, it is more challenging for
multi-modal medical data. To facilitate the production
and management of multi-modal medical data, traditional
methods are not sufficient and various ML/DL techniques
are proposed in the literature [60], [61].
In routine practice, clinicians usually compare the current
cases with the previous ones, mainly to effectively plan
the diagnosis and treatment of the patient being examined.
In this regard, identifying modality (i.e., modality classifi-
cation discussed above) is of great significance as it serves
as an initial tool to facilitate the process of comparison
and an efficient modality classification system will reduce
the search space by only looking for relevant images in
the collections of the desired modality.
3) Applications of ML in Treatment:
a) Image Interpretation: As discussed above, medical
images are widely used in the routine clinical practice and
the analysis and interpretation of these images are performed
by expert physicians and radiologists. To narrate the findings
regarding images being studied, they write textual radiology
reports about each body organ that was examined in the
conducted study. However, writing such reports is very chal-
lenging in some scenarios, e.g., less experienced radiologists
and healthcare service providers in rural areas where the
quality of healthcare services is not up to the mark. On the
other side, for experienced radiologists and pathologists, the
process of preparing high-quality reports can be tedious and
time-consuming which can be exacerbated by a large number
of patients visiting daily. Therefore, various researchers have
attempted to address this problem using natural language
processing (NLP) and ML techniques. In [62], a natural
language processing based method is proposed for annotating
clinical radiology reports. A multi-task ML based framework
is proposed for automatic tagging and description of medical
images [63]. In a similar study [64], an end-to-end architecture
developed with the integration of CNN and RNN is presented
for thorax disease classification and reporting in chest X-
rays. In [65], a novel multi-modal model utilizing CNN and
long short term memory (LSTM) network is developed for
automatic report generation.
b) ML in Real-time Health Monitoring: Real-time mon-
itoring of critical patients is crucial and is a key component
of the treatment process. Continuous health monitoring using
wearable devices, IoT sensors, and smartphones is gaining
interest among people. In a typical setting of continuous health
monitoring, health data is collected using a wearable device
and smartphone and then transmitted to the cloud for analysis
using an ML/DL technique. Then the outcomes are transmitted
back to the device for appropriate action(s). For instance, a
framework having a similar system architecture is presented
in [66]. The system is developed by integrating mobile and
cloud for monitoring of heart rate using PPG signals. Simi-
larly, a review of different ML techniques for human activity
recognition with application to remote monitoring of patients
using wearable devices is presented in [67]. The sharing of
health data with clouds for further analysis raises many privacy
and security challenges that we discuss in the next section.
4) Applications of ML in Clinical Workflows:
a) Disease Prediction and Diagnosis: The early predic-
tion and diagnosis of diseases from medical data are one
of the exciting applications of ML. Various studies have
highlighted the potential of using predictive healthcare for
the timely treatment of diseases. For instance, the case of
cardiovascular risk prediction using different ML algorithms
with clinical data is studied in [68] and the study concluded
that ML techniques improved the prediction efficacy. A survey
of various ML techniques for the detection and diagnosis of
different diseases (such as diabetes, dengue, hepatitis, heart,
and liver) is presented in [69]. The potential of using ML-
based methods for prediction and prognosis of cancer is
highlighted in [70].
b) ML in Computer-Aided Detection or Diagnosis: The
computer-aided detection (CADe) or computer-aided diagnosis
(CADx) systems are being developed mainly for the auto-
matic interpretation of medical images that would assist the
radiologist in their clinical practice. The system works by
utilizing different functionalities including ML/DL, traditional
computer vision and image processing techniques and relies
heavily on the performance of these techniques. IBM’s Wat-
son is a classical example of CADx system developed by
integrating various techniques including ML. However, any
task in medical image and signal analysis automated by the
application of ML/DL models can be deemed as a CADe or
CADx systems, e.g., automation detection of fatty liver in
ultrasound kurtosis imaging [71].
c) Clinical Reinforcement Learning: In reinforcement
learning, the key objective is to learn a policy function for
making precise decisions in an uncertain environment to
maximise accumulated reward. In clinical medicine, RL can be
used for providing optimal diagnosis and treatment for patients
with distinct characteristics [72]. The performance evaluation
of different RL techniques (i.e., Q-value iteration, tabular Q-
learning, fitted Q-iteration (FQI), and deep Q-learning) for the
treatment of sepsis in ICU using real-world medical dataset
is presented in [73]. Sepsis is a severe infection involving
organ dysfunction and is a leading cause of mortality due
to expensive and suboptimal treatment. The dataset contains
trajectories of a patient’s physiological state and the provided
treatments by clinicians at each time, along with the outcome
(i.e., survival or mortality). The study concluded that simple
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Fig. 4: The pipeline for data-driven predictive clinical care and various sources of vulnerabilities at each stage.
and tabular Q-learning can learn effective policies for sepsis
treatment and their performance is comparable with a complex
continuous state-space method, i.e., deep Q-learning.
d) ML for Clinical Time-Series Data: One of the tasks in
clinical workflows is the modeling of clinical time-series data.
Applications of clinical time-series modeling include predic-
tion of clinical interventions in intensive care units (ICUs)
using CNN and LSTM [74], mortality prediction in patients
with traumatic brain injury (TBI) [75], and estimation of mean
arterial blood pressure (ABP) and intracranial pressure (ICP)
which are important indicators cerebrovascular autoregulation
(CA) in TBI patients. In a recent study, attention models are
used for the management of ICUs forecasting tasks (such as
diagnosis, estimation, and prediction, etc.) by integrating clin-
ical notes with multivariate and time-series measurements data
[76]. In a similar study, the problem of unexpected respiratory
decompensation using ML techniques is investigated in [77].
e) Clinical Natural Language Processing: Clinical notes
are a widely used tool by the clinicians to communicate patient
state. The use of clinical text is crucial as it often contains
the most important information. The progress in clinical NLP
techniques is envisioned to be incorporated in future clinical
software for extracting relevant information from unstructured
clinical notes for improving clinical practice and research
[78]. Clinical NLP offers unique challenges such as the use
of acronyms, language disparity, partial structure, and quality
variance, etc. The challenges and opportunities of clinical NLP
for languages other than English along with a review of clinical
NLP techniques is presented in [79]. In [80], authors presented
a toolkit named CLAMP that provides different state of the
art NLP techniques for clinical text analysis.
f) Clinical Speech and Audio Processing: In the clinical
environment, clinicians have to do a lot of documentation, i.e.,
preparing clinical notes, discharge summaries, and radiology
reports, etc. According to Dr. Simon Wallace, clinicians spend
50% of their time on clinical documentation and are highly
demotivated due to clinical workload, administrative tasks, and
lack of leisure time [81]. Typically, they spend more time in
preparing clinical documentation as compared to interacting
directly with patients. To overcome such challenges, clinical
speech and audio processing offer new opportunities such
as speech interfaces for interaction less services, automatic
transcription of patient conversations, and synthesis of clin-
ical notes, etc. There are many benefits for using speech
and audio processing tools in the clinical environment for
each stakeholder, i.e., patients (speech is a new modality
for determining patient state), clinicians (efficiency and time-
saving), and healthcare industry (enhance productivity and
cost reduction). In the literature, speech processing has been
used for the identification of disorders related to speech,
e.g., vocal hyperfunction [82] and as well as disorders that
manifest through speech, e.g., dementia [83]. Alzheimer’s
disease identification using linguistic features is presented in
[84]. In clinical speech processing, disfluency and utterance
segmentation are two well-known challenges of clinical speech
processing.
III. SECURE, PRIVATE, AND ROBUST ML FOR
HEALTHCARE: CHALLENGES
In this section, we analyze the security and robustness of
ML/DL models in healthcare settings and present various
associated challenges.
A. Sources of Vulnerabilities in ML Pipeline
ML application in healthcare settings suffers from various
privacy and security challenges that we will thoroughly discuss
in this section. In addition, the three major phases of ML
model development along with different potential sources of
vulnerabilities causing such challenges in each step of the ML
pipeline are depicted in Figure 4.
1) Vulnerabilities in Data Collection: Training of ML/DL
models for clinical decision support requires the collection
of a large amount of data (in formats such as EHRs, medical
images, radiology reports, etc.), which is in general often time-
consuming and requires significant human efforts. Although
in practice, medical data is carefully collected to ensure the
effectiveness of the diagnosis, however, there can be many
sources of vulnerabilities that can affect the proper (expected)
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functionality of the underlying ML/DL systems, a few of them
are described next.
Instrumental and Environmental Noise: The collected data
often contains many artifacts that arise due to instrumental and
environmental disturbances. Let’s consider the example of one
of the widely used imagining modalities used to acquire high-
resolution medical images, i.e., multishot MRI. This modality
is highly sensitive to motion, and even slight movement of the
subject’s head or respiration can cause undesirable artifacts
in the resultant image [14], thereby increasing the risk of
misdiagnosis [85].
Unqualified Personnel: Healthcare ecosystems are ex-
tremely interdisciplinary and comprise of technical and non-
technical personnel and often lack qualified workers that can
develop and maintain ML/DL systems. As for the efficient
application of data-driven healthcare, workers with strong
statistical and computational backgrounds are required, e.g.,
engineers and data scientists. On the contrary, the clinical
usability of ML/DL based systems is extremely important.
Considering this aspect, hospitals tend to rely solely on
physician-researchers who lack computational expertise to
develop such systems [86].
2) Vulnerabilities Due to Data Annotation: Most applica-
tions of ML/DL in healthcare systems are supervised ML tasks
which require an abundance of labelled training data. The
process of assigning labels to each data sample (e.g., medical
image) is known as data annotation. Ideally, this task shall
mostly be performed by experienced clinicians (physicians
or radiologists) to prepare domain-enriched datasets which
are crucial to the development of useful ML/DL models in
healthcare systems. The literature has revealed that training
ML/DL models without a sound grip of the domain could
be disastrous [87]. However, clinicians like expert radiologists
are rare professionals and hard to engage in secondary tasks
like data annotation. As a result, trainee staff (with little
domain expertise) or ML/DL automated algorithms are usually
employed during data labelling, which often leads to many
problems such as coarse-grained labels, class imbalance, label
leakage, and misspecification. Some specific data annotation-
based vulnerabilities are discussed as below:
Ambiguous Ground Truth: In medical datasets, the ground
truth is often ambiguous, e.g., medical image classification
task [22] and even expert clinicians disagree on well-defined
diagnostic tasks [88]. This problem becomes more adverse
with the presence of malicious users who want to perturb
data, making the diagnosis difficult and causing difficulties
in detecting its influence even with a human expert review.
Improper Annotation: The annotation of data samples pro-
cess for life-critical healthcare applications should be informed
by proper guidelines and various privacy and legal considera-
tions [89]. Most widely used healthcare datasets are annotated
for coarse-grained labels whereas real-life utility of ML/DL
is to highlight rare, fine-grained and hidden strata within
the clinical environment. This inability to perform labelling
appropriately can lead to various efficiency challenges that are
discussed next.
Efficiency Challenges: The collections of healthcare data
on which ML/DL models are built suffer from various issues
that arise several efficiency challenges. A few major problems
impacting the quality of data are described next.
(a) Limited and Imbalanced Datasets: The size of datasets
used for training ML/DL models is not up to the required
scale. In particular, one major limitation of the efficient
application of DL approaches in healthcare is the unavail-
ability of large-scale datasets, as health data is often small
in size. Notably, most life-threating health conditions are
naturally rare and diagnosed once in many (thousands
to millions) patients. Therefore, most ML/DL algorithms
can not be efficiently trained and optimized for such life-
threatening healthcare task.
(b) Data Augmentation: To circumvent the problem of avail-
ability of large scale medical datasets, one commonly
followed method is data augmentation in which vari-
ous techniques (such as cropping, filliping, rotation, and
translation, etc.) are used for diversifying the training
data and increasing its size. In addition, different trans-
formation techniques are used for augmenting training
datasets, e.g., use of Gaussian for data augmentation [90],
[91]. However, the use of data augmentation might reduce
the robustness of the developed ML/DL based system,
for example, it is highly likely that the distribution of
transformed data diverges from the underlying actual dis-
tribution of the training data which is unknown generally
and there are no statistical and probabilistical guarantees
for having same distribution of the training data. The
literature suggest that Guassain data augmentation does
not improves the adversarial robustness of the models
against iterative attacks [92].
(c) Class Imbalance and Bias: Class imbalance is yet another
problem that arises in the supervised ML/DL which refers
to the fact that the distribution of samples among classes
is not uniform. If a class imbalanced dataset is used for
training of the model then it will be reflected in the
model’s outcomes in terms of bias to certain categories.
Biases in models’ predictions in healthcare settings will
have profound consequences and should, therefore, be
mitigated. Various approaches have been proposed in
the literature to address class imbalance problems. These
approaches are discussed in the next section.
(d) Sparsity: Data sparsity, i.e., missing values are common
in real-world data that arise due to various reasons (e.g.,
unmeasured and unreported samples, etc.). Missing val-
ues and observations significantly affect the performance
of ML/DL techniques.
3) Vulnerabilities in Model Training: The vulnerabilities
regarding model training include improper or incomplete train-
ing, privacy breaches, model poisoning and stealing. Improper
or incomplete training refers to the situations when the ML/DL
model is trained with improper parameters, e.g., learning rate,
epochs, batch size. Moreover, ML/DL models have been found
strictly vulnerable to various security and privacy threats such
as adversarial attacks [20], model [93] and data poisoning
attacks [94], etc. The vulnerabilities of ML/DL systems hinder
their efficient deployment for security-critical applications
(such as digital forensic, bio-metrics, etc.) and as well as life-
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critical applications (such as self-driving cars and healthcare,
etc.). Therefore, ensuring the security and integrity of the
ML/DL systems is of paramount importance for such critical
applications. Various security threats associated with ML/DL
systems are thoroughly described in the next section.
4) Vulnerabilities in Deployment Phase: The deployment
of ML/DL techniques in a clinical environment essentially
involves human-centric decisions. Therefore, ensuring the ro-
bustness of the system while considering fairness and account-
ability is necessary for the deployment phase. The following
are the major vulnerabilities that can be encountered in the de-
ployment phase of ML/DL systems. Whereas, security issues
(e.g., adversarial attacks) are discussed in the next section.
Distribution Shifts: Distributions shifts are very much ex-
pected in realistic healthcare settings, for example, let’s con-
sider different imaging centers and DL models trained on
images of one domain (imaging center) are subsequently
deployed on different domain images. In such settings, the per-
formance of the underlying DL model degrades significantly.
Moreover, in predictive healthcare, ML models are developed
using historical patient data and are usually tested on the new
patients which raise questions about the efficacy of the ML
predictions. Moreover, such differences can be exploited for
generating adversarial examples [95].
Incomplete Data: In realistic settings, data collected for
providing patient care may contain missing observations or
variables, e.g., EHRs. The simplest way to avoid missing
values is to ignore them completely while doing analysis
but it cannot be done without knowing their relationships
with already observed or unobserved data. Using the missing
observations for training ML/DL models, on the other hand,
leads to two well-known problems, i.e., false positives (a
healthy person is diagnosed with a disease) and false negatives
(a patient is identified as healthy). Both problems can have
severe outcomes in actual healthcare settings, therefore, the
healthcare data should be complete and compact in all aspects
to ensure accurate predictions of outcomes.
5) Vulnerabilities in Testing Phase: Vulnerabilities in the
testing phase are concerned with the interpretation of the
results from the underlying ML/DL systems that include
misinterpretation, false positive, and false-negative outcomes.
False-positive and false-negative outcomes are due to incom-
plete/inefficient training of the model or due to incomplete
data fed for the inference that we have discussed in the earlier
section. Finally, the true essence of ML empowered healthcare
is not just about turning a crank but it demands the cautious
application of analytical methods [96].
B. The Security of ML: An Overview
In this section, we provide an overview of ML security
particularly from the perspective of healthcare and highlight
various associated security challenges with the use of ML.
1) Security Threats: The security threats on ML systems
can be broadly categorized into three dimensions, i.e., influ-
ence attacks, security violations, and attack specificity [97]. A
taxonomy of these security threats on ML systems is depicted
in Figure 5.
Fig. 5: A taxonomy of different security threats on ML/DL
models.
(a) Influence: Influence attacks can be of two types: (1)
causative: the one that attempts to get control over
training data; (2) exploratory: the one that exploits the
miss-classification of the ML model without intervening
the model training.
(b) Security Violation: It is concerned with the availability
and integrity of the services and can be categorized into
three types: (1) integrity attack: It attempts to increase
the false-negative rate of the deployed model (classifier)
when the model is given harmful inputs; (2) availability
attack: Unlike integrity attack, it tries to achieve an
increase in the false-positive rate of the classifier in re-
sponse to benign inputs; (3) privacy violation attack: It is
concerned with the unveiling of sensitive and confidential
information of the training data, trained model or both.
(c) Attack Specificity: The specificity of an attack can be
defined in two ways: (1) targeted attack: whether the
attack is intended for a specific input sample or a group
of samples; (2) indiscriminate attack: it causes the ML
model to fail indiscriminately.
The first axis in the taxonomy of the attacks on ML/DL
systems (as shown in Figure 5) defines the capabilities of the
adversaries, e.g., whether they are able to modify training
process by injecting poisoned data or not (i.e., attempting
access to training data). If the attacker does not have access to
the training data, the attacker can realize an exploratory attack,
e.g., consider a disease classification problem, the adversary
can exploit query-response pairs to get intended behavior
(i.e., misclassification in this case). The second dimension
of attacks is concerned with the type of security violations
that an adversary can perform, e.g., trying to learn about the
privacy of users in training data or attempting to increase the
false-negative or false-positive rate of the classifier. Each type
of security violation is severely problematic for healthcare
applications, i.e., preserving the privacy of users is a matter
of high concern, and models with minimum uncertainty are
highly desirable. The third dimension describes the specific
objectives of the adversary. The attacker might be interested
in attempting a targeted attack, e.g., forcing the classifier to
classify a given input sample to a target class (e.g., bypassing
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disease detection system by influencing the detector to identify
the input as benign), or, he might intend to break down the
classifier in an indiscriminate manner.
2) Adversarial Machine Learning (ML): Adversarial at-
tacks are the result of recent efforts for identifying vulner-
abilities in ML/DL models training and inference. Adversarial
attacks have appeared as one of the biggest security threats to
ML/DL systems [20], [98], [99], [100], [101]. In adversarial
attacks, the key goal of an adversary is to generate adversarial
examples by adding small carefully crafted (unnoticeable)
perturbation into the actual (non-modified) input samples to
evade the integrity of the ML/DL system. In general, there
are two types of adversarial attacks that are described next.
(a) Poisoning Attacks: Adversarial attacks affecting the
model training, i.e., manipulating the training data to
mislead the learning of ML/DL model are known as
poisoning attacks [93].
(b) Evasion Attacks: Adversarial attacks on the inference
phase of the training process are known as evasion
attacks [102]. In such attacks, an attacker manipulates
the test data to compromise the integrity of the ML/DL
model to harmful inputs.
In healthcare applications, poisoning attacks are highly
relevant because direct manipulation of the training data may
be difficult or even impossible in some cases. Alternatively,
the addition of new samples might be relatively easy, how-
ever, any such consequences hinder the applicability of the
ML/DL systems. Therefore, the detection of poisoning attacks
is critical for the robust application of ML/DL in healthcare
applications. For instance, systematic poisoning attacks against
six conventional ML models that were developed for hypothy-
roid diagnosis are presented in [103], where the objective of
the attacker was to prevent hypothyroid diagnosis.
Similarly, a few researchers have highlighted the threat
of these attacks to ML/DL models in healthcare settings
and we provide insights from such articles in this section.
Unlike adversarial examples created for evading ML/DL mod-
els in other settings, the concept of adversarial patients for
healthcare applications is introduced in [17]. The authors
argue that rather than intentional adversarial examples, the
caution should be for unintentional adversarial patients that
can lead to severe ethical issues. They identified a subgroup of
adversarial patients and empirically validated that patients with
identical predictive features can have significantly different
individual treatment effects. In recent studies, white box and
black box adversarial attacks have been demonstrated against
three clinical applications; namely, fundoscopy, dermoscopy,
and chest X-ray analysis [22], [104]. Furthermore, in [104],
authors highlighted various potential incentives for adversaries
via adversarial attacks in clinical trials that will rise with
the increasing use of ML in the future, particularly, with the
emergence of computer-aided diagnosis and decision support
systems.
Adversarial ML is a major dilemma for the security and
privacy of ML/DL models deployed in healthcare biometrics
applications and can lead to sever unintended circumstances.
Biometrics can provide many advantages, e.g., fraud detec-
tion, protection of confidential medical records, and securing
medical facilities and equipment, etc. In this regard, different
biometrics technologies such as palm vein readers, fingerprint,
ECG, and iris scanners [105], and face recognition have great
potential to be deployed in healthcare systems. It is very
common to use ML/DL techniques for building healthcare
biometric systems, which are themselves vulnerable to security
and privacy attacks [106], [107], [108]. For example, an
adversary can easily evade a face recognition system that is
deployed in a restricted area to restrain unintended access for
security purposes.
C. ML for Healthcare: Challenges
In this section, we discuss various challenges which hinders
the applicability of ML/DL systems in practical healthcare
applications.
1) Safety Challenges: Excellent performance in a con-
trolled lab environment (which is a common ML community
practice) is not evidence of safety. Safety of ML/DL is the
determination of how safe the ML/DL system is for patients.
There should be a constant thought of safety throughout the
ML/DL lifecycle. Majority of routine clinicians tasks are
mundane, and patients they encounter have common health
conditions. It is their role of diagnosing rare, subtle, and hid-
den health conditions which occur once in millions. Enabling
ML/DL to performing well on hidden strata, outliers, edge, and
subtle cases is key to ensure the safety of current AI systems.
2) Privacy Challenges: Privacy is one of the major chal-
lenges in data-driven healthcare which is concerned with the
use of users’ data by the ML/DL systems for making pre-
dictions. The users (i.e., patients) expect that their healthcare
service providers are following necessary safety measures to
safeguard their inherent right to the privacy of their confiden-
tial information, e.g., age, sex, date of birth, and health data.
Potential privacy threats can be of two types, i.e., unveiling
confidential information and malicious use of data (potentially
by unauthorized agents).
Privacy depends upon the characteristics and nature of the
data being collected, the environment it has been created in,
and patients’ demographics. Therefore, mitigation of privacy
breaches using the appropriate technique(s) is critical as such
breaches can directly harm the patients. The confidential data
should be anonymized to prevent privacy breaches such as (re-
)identification of the individuals [109]. Moreover, necessary
attention should be paid to understand privacy concerns at
each stage of data processing and the transfer of data among
different departments within a hospital should be communi-
cated in a secure environment.
Privacy challenges also arise with adoption of ML/DL tech-
niques for building biometric healthcare systems either offline
(e.g., face or fingerprint recognition based system to protect
medical facilities and equipment [110]) or online systems,
e.g., real-time medical systems [111] and use of biometrics
for authentication of medical IoT devices [112], etc. The
security and privacy of such systems are of utmost importance;
therefore, worst-case robustness test should be performed for
biometrically secure healthcare systems. Worst-case testing
is a powerful tool that can provide enough evidence about
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systems robustness and can distinguish from a system that
never fails and a system that fails once in billion trails.
3) Ethical Challenges: In user-centric applications of ML
such as healthcare, it is important to ensure the ethical use
of data. Explicit measures should be taken to understand the
targeted user population and their sociological aspects before
collecting data for building ML models. Moreover, understand-
ing how data collection can harm a patient’s well-being and
dignity is an important consideration in this regard. If ethical
concerns are not taken into account then the application of ML
in realistic settings will have adverse results. Furthermore, to
ensure fair and ethical operation of automated systems, it is
imperative to have a clear understanding of the AI system in
uncertain and complex scenarios [113].
4) Causality is Challenging: Understanding causality is
important in healthcare because most of the crucial healthcare
problems require causal reasoning, i.e., “what if?” [114]. For
example, asking a question about what will happen if a doctor
prescribed treatment A instead of treatment B. Such questions
cannot be exploited through classical learning algorithms and
to answer them we need to analyze the data from the lens of
causality [115]. In healthcare, learning is often solely based
on observational data and asking causal questions by learning
from observational data is quite challenging which requires
building causal models.
DL models are black-box which lacks fundamental under-
lying theory and these models essentially work by exploiting
patterns and correlations without considering any causal link
[116]. In general, this cannot be deemed as a limitation since
prediction does not require any causal relation. In predictive
healthcare, the absence of causal relation can raise questions
about the conclusions that can be drawn from outcomes of DL
models. Furthermore, fairness in decision making can better
be enforced through the lens of causal reasoning [117], [118].
The estimation of the causal effect of some variable(s) on
a target output (e.g., target class in multi-class classification
problem) is important to ensure fair predictions.
5) Regulatory and Policy Challenges: The full potential
of ML/DL systems (which essentially constitutes software as
a medical device) in actual healthcare settings can only be
realized by addressing regulatory and policy challenges. The
literature suggests that the regulatory guidelines are needed
for both medical ML/DL systems and their integration in
actual clinical settings [131]. Therefore, the integration of AI-
empowered ML/DL systems in the actual clinical environment
should be in compliance with the policies and regulations
defined by the government and regulatory agencies. However,
existing regulations are not suitable for certifying systems
which are ever-evolving such as ML/DL empowered systems
because yet another key challenge with the use of ML/DL
algorithms in clinical practice is to determine how these
models should be implemented and regulated since these
models will incorporate learning from the new patient data
[132]. In addition, the objective clinical evaluation of ML/DL
systems for particular clinical settings is crucial to ensure
safe, effective, and robust operation that does not harm the
patients in either way. Data scientist and AI engineers should
be employed in hospitals for assessing AI systems regularly
to ensure it is still safe, relevant, and working fine.
6) Availability of Good Quality Data: The availability of
representative, diverse and high-quality data is one of the
major challenges in healthcare. For instance, the amount
of data available to the research community is very small
in size and limited in scope as compared to the heteroge-
neous collections of large-scale multi-modal patient data being
generated on daily basis by different small and large size
healthcare institutions. However, the development of good
quality data that resembles real clinical settings is on the
other very challenging and requires resources for management
and maintenance. The availability of high-quality data can
effectively serve the intended purpose of disease prediction
and decision making for planning treatment.
The data collected in practice suffer from different issues
such as subjectivity, redundancy, and bias. As the ML/DL
models perform inferences by solely learning the latent factors
of the data on which they are trained, therefore, the effect of
data generated by the undesirable past practices of hospitals
will be reflected in the outcomes of the algorithm. For exam-
ple, most people with no health insurance are denied health-
care services and if AI learns from that data, it will do the
same. It has been shown that a model could depict racial bias
by producing varying outcomes for different subpopulations
[133] and the training data can also introduce its own modeling
challenges [134], [135].
7) Lack of Data Standardization and Exchange: Medical
ML/DL system shall facilitate a deep understanding of the
underlying healthcare task, which (in most cases) can only be
achieved by utilising other forms of patients data. For example,
radiology is not all about clinical imaging. Other patient EMR
data is crucial for radiologists to derive the precise conclusion
for an imaging study. This calls for the integration and data
exchange between all healthcare systems. Despite extensive
research on data exchange standards for healthcare, there is
a huge ignorance in following those standards in healthcare
IT systems which broadly affects the quality and efficacy of
healthcare data, accumulated through these systems. There
are numerous guidelines to perform specific medical inter-
ventions like imaging studies (i.e., with define exposure and
positioning) to ensure the significance of the data clinically.
However, current healthcare IT systems largely ignore stan-
dards and clinicians barely follow well-established guidelines.
As a result, data integration and exchange efforts across
different specialities and organisations fail. Data integration
to match diverse patients’ medical records is crucial to deliver
high-value patient care. The lack of appetite to implement
data exchange standards in wider healthcare industry hinders
the efficacy of ML/DL systems as multi-modal data is vital
to ensure the deep understanding of algorithms, and will
undoubtedly enhance the performance of physicians towards
clinical decisions using data driven insights.
8) Distribution Shifts: The problem of data distribution
shifts is yet another major challenge and perhaps one of the
most challenging problems to solve [136]. In clinical practice,
training and testing data distributions can diverge due to many
reasons, e.g., medical data is generated by different institutions
using different devices for patients having complicated cases.
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TABLE II: Summary of the state of the art data secure and privacy preserving methods in healthcare settings.
Authors Goal Method ML Model(s) Medical Dataset(s)
David et al. [119]
Security & Privacy
Commodity based cryptography. Hyperplane decisionand Naive Bayes classifiers. N/A
Zhu et al. [62] Polynomial aggregation and multi-
party random masking.
SVM with nonlinear kernel. N/A
Jagielski et al. [120] Proposed an algorithm names as
TRIM to defend poisoning attacks.
Linear Regression Anticoagulant drug War-
farin
Liu et al. [121] XMPP server and several mobile
devices.
Proposed a DL framework, Human Activity Recogni-
tion
Malathi et al. [122] Paillier homomorphic encryption. Naı¨ve Bayes, SVM, Neural
Network, and FKNN–CBR
Indian Liver Patient
Takabi et al. [123] Homomorphic encryption. DNN 15 datasets from UCI
repository.
Kim et al. [124] Homomorphic encryption based
secure logistic regression.
Logistic Regression Five medical datasets hav-
ing binary classes.
Bogdanov et al. [125] Multi-party computation Principal component analysis
(PCA)
Genomics data
Min et al. [126] Reinforcement learning (RL) based
privacy aware offloading method.
Reinforcement learning (RL) Data from medical IoT
sensors.
Beaulieu et al. [127] Distributed ML using differential
privacy.
N/A The eICU and The Cancer
Genome Atlas databases.
Zhu et al. [128] Encryption using random masking
technique.
Non-linear support vector ma-
chine (SVM)
Pima Indians diabetes
database.
Choudhury et al. [129] Differential privacy and federated
learning.
SVM, Perceptron, and logistic
regression.
MIMIC III database
Liu et al. [130] Federated learning. Three layer neural network. The eICU database.
Due to this issue, ML/DL models developed using available
public databases (by the scientific community and academi-
cians) do not give expected performance when deployed in an
actual clinical environment. Distribution shifts are frequent in
the medical domain, in particular, medical imagining where
different protocols and parameter choices can result in images
of significantly different distributions. ML models are typically
trained under the principle of empirical risk minimization
(ERM) which provides good learning bounds and guarantees
if its assumptions are satisfied. For instance, one of the
foremost and strong assumptions is that both the training
and test datasets are derived from a similar domain (i.e.,
data distributions). However, this assumption is not valid in
practice, and models trained under such an assumption fail to
generalize to other domains In contrast, the life-critical nature
of clinical applications demands a smooth and safe operation
of ML/DL techniques.
9) Updating Hospital Infrastructure is Hard: Healthcare IT
systems are mostly proprietary and operate in silos, which re-
sults in the revision, fixing, and update of software being costly
and time-consuming. It has been reported in the literature that
in 2013, the majority of hospitals were using the ninth version
of the international classification of disease (ICD) system—
even though a revised version (i.e., ICD-10) was released
as early as 1990 [22]. The difficulties in updating hospital
software infrastructure can raise many vulnerabilities with the
use of modern tools like ML/DL systems.
IV. SECURE, PRIVATE, AND ROBUST ML FOR
HEALTHCARE: SOLUTIONS
In this section, we present an overview of various proposed
methods to ensure secure, private, and robust ML for health-
care applications. A summary of articles focused on the topic
of “secure and privacy-preserving ML for healthcare” is pre-
sented in Table II and various approaches for secure, private,
and robust ML are described next. In addition, a taxonomy
of commonly used approaches for secure, private, and robust
ML is presented in Figure 6 and described individually next.
A. Privacy-Preserving ML
Preserving the privacy of the user in healthcare is
paramount, as it is a user-centric application and involves
the collection of personal data and any breach of privacy can
lead to unavoidable consequences. Preserving privacy means
that ML model training and inference should not reveal any
additional information about the subjects from whom data was
collected. In general, ML/DL requires training data stored on
a central repository (e.g., cloud) that may include the users’
private data which raises various threats and to address such
concerns data anonymization techniques are used. However, it
has been reported in the literature that meaningful information
can be inferred about individuals’ private data even when the
data is anonymized [137].
Various efforts in the literature have addressed the privacy
issues with the use of ML. Three different protocols for the
two-server model are presented in [138], where the private
data is distributed among two non-colluding servers by the
data owners and then those servers train the ML models
on the joint data by following secure two-party computation
(2PC). Furthermore, different techniques have been proposed
to perform secure arithmetic operations in the secure multi-
party computational environment and alternatives to nonlinear
activation functions used in ML models such as softmax and
sigmoid are also proposed. Similarly, various techniques for
privacy-preserving ML such as cryptographic and differential
privacy approaches are discussed in [109]. Here we briefly
discuss the widely used methods for preserving privacy.
1) Cryptographic Approaches: Cryptographic approaches
are used in the scenarios where the ML model requires en-
crypted data (for training and testing purposes) from multiple
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Fig. 6: A taxonomy of commonly used approaches for secure, private, and robust ML.
parties. The widely used methods include homomorphic en-
cryption, secret sharing, garbled circuits, and secure processors
which are briefly described next.
(a) Homomorphic Encryption: It enables computations on
encrypted data with operations such as addition and
multiplication which can be used as a basis for computing
complex functions. Typically, the data is encrypted using
ciphertext and public keys of the original data owners.
(b) Garbled Circuits: Garbled circuits are used in cases
where two parties (let’s assume Alice and Bob) want
to get results computed using their private data. Alice
will send the function in the form of the garbled circuit
along with her input. After obtaining the garbled version
of his input from Alice in oblivious fashion, Bob will
use his garbled input with the garbled circuit to get the
result of the required function and can share it with Alice,
if required. The use of homomorphic encryption and
garbled circuits to build cryptographic blocks for develop-
ing three classification techniques; namely, Naı¨ve Bayes,
decision trees, and hyperplane decision is presented in
[144], where the goal is to protect ML models and new
samples submitted for inference.
(c) Secret Sharing: The strategy of distributing secret among
multiple parties while holding a “share” of the secret
is known as secret sharing. The secret can only be
reconstructed when all individual shares are combined;
otherwise, they are unuseful. In some settings, the secret
is reconstructed using t shares (where t is a threshold
value) that will not require all shares to be combined. A
secret sharing paradigm for computing privacy-preserving
parallelized principal component analysis (PCA) is pre-
sented in [125]. In a similar study [142], a protocol is
developed using the “secret sharing” strategy for ag-
gregating model updates received from multiple input
parties, the updates are used for training of the ML model.
A privacy-preserving emotion recognition framework is
presented in [143]. Authors used a multi-secret sharing
scheme for transmitting audio-visual data collected from
users using edge devices to the cloud where a CNN and
sparse autoencoder were applied for feature extraction
and support vector machine (SVM) was used for emotion
recognition.
(d) Secure Processors: Secure processors were originally
developed by rogue software to ensure the confidentiality
and integrity of sensitive code from unauthorized access
at higher privilege levels. However, these processors are
being utilized in privacy-preserving computation, e.g.,
Intel SGXprocessor. For instance, Ohrimenko et al. devel-
oped an SGX-processor-based data oblivious system for
k-mean clustering, decision trees, SVM, and matrix fac-
torization [146]. The key idea was to enable collaboration
between multiple data owners running the ML task on an
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TABLE III: The comparisons of different techniques that can be used for privacy-preserving machine learning (ML).
Technique Methodology Papers Advantage (s) Limitation (s)
Homomorphic
Encryption
Computations are performed on en-
crypted data that is encrypted using
different cryptographic approaches.
[139], [140], [141] Can be used for outsourcing computa-
tions on private data.
Slow and computationally intensive and
can only receive input from one entity.
Multi-Party
Computation
Computations are performed on se-
cret inputs from multiple parties.
[125], [142], [143] Fast and less overhead and can receive
input from multiple parties and ensures
the correctness of input and privacy.
It becomes slow with a large number of
participating parties.
Garbled Cir-
cuits
Garbled circuits are used in cases
where two parties want to get re-
sults computed using their private
data.
[144], [145], [138] Secure computation on the private data
of multiple parties.
Low latency, as it requires the compu-
tation of expensive operations.
Secure
Processors
Collaboration between multiple
data owners is performed through
an SGX-enabled data center.
[146], [147], [148] Adversaries can get control over data
and software except the SGX-processor
being used for computations.
Adversaries can get control over data
and software.
Differential
Privacy
Random statistical noise is added
to each attribute, to protect privacy.
[127], [149], [150] Highly practical, as no computational
overhead is involved because no en-
cryption is performed.
Addition of noise effects precision and
has some limitations from security per-
spectives.
Federated
Learning
A shared model is collaboratively
trained from distributed data with-
out sharing the data itself.
[151], [152], [130] Less communication overhead, as local
data is not required to be transmitted
and enables collaborative learning.
Parameters optimization in federated
learning is challenging.
SGX-enabled data center. All types of communications
between the data owners and the enclave were performed
by establishing independently a secure channel (i.e., an
individual channel for each data owner).
2) Differential Privacy: Differential privacy refers to the
mechanism of adding perturbation into the datasets to pro-
tect private data. The idea of adding adequate noise in the
database for preserving privacy was first introduced by C.
Dwork in 2006 [153]. Differential privacy constitutes a strong
standard for guaranteeing privacy for algorithms performing
analysis on aggregate databases and it is defined in terms
of the application-specific concept of neighbor datasets [154].
Differential privacy is particularly useful for applications like
healthcare due to its several properties such as group privacy,
composability, and robustness to auxiliary information. Group
privacy implies elegant degradation of privacy guarantees
when datasets contain correlated samples. Whereas, compos-
ability enables modularity of the algorithmic design, i.e., when
individual components are differentially private. Robustness
to auxiliary information means that the privacy of the system
will not be affected by the use of any side’s information that
is known to the adversary. To avoid privacy breaches, the
researchers can also explore encrypted and noisy datasets for
building ML empowered healthcare applications [155].
Various approaches for differential privacy have been pro-
posed in the literature, e.g., private aggregation of teacher
ensembles (PATE) for private ML [156], differentially pri-
vate stochastic gradient descent (DP-SGD) algorithm [154],
moments accountant [157], hyperparameter selection [158],
Laplace [159] and exponential noise differential privacy mech-
anisms [160], [161]. For instance, privacy-preserving dis-
tributed DL for clinical data using differential privacy that
incorporates the idea of cyclical weight transfer is presented
in [127].
3) Federated Learning: The idea of federated learning (FL)
has been recently proposed by Google Inc. [162]. In FL, a
shared ML model is built using distributed data from multiple
devices where each device trains the model using its local data
and then shares the model parameters with the central model
without sharing its actual data. An FL-based decentralized
scheme using iterative cluster primal-dual splitting (cPDS)
algorithm to predict hospitalization requiring patients using
large-scale EHR of heart-related diseases is presented in [151].
In [152], simple vanilla, U-shaped, and vertically partitioned
data-based configurations for split learning DL models are pre-
sented. The proposed framework is named SplitNN that does
not require sharing of patients’ critical data with the server.
A framework of federated autonomous deep learning (FADL)
using distributed EHR is presented in [130]. A comparison
of different privacy preserving techniques discussed above is
presented in Table III.
B. Countermeasures Against Adversarial Attacks
In the recent literature, countermeasures against adversarial
attacks are categorized into three classes: (1) modifying model;
(2) modifying data; and (3) adding an auxiliary model(s) [163].
A taxonomy of such methods is presented in Figure 7 and are
discussed next.
1) Modifying Model: The modifying model includes meth-
ods that modify the parameters or features of the trained ML
model, widely used methods include the following:
• Defensive Distillation: The distillation of neural networks
was first introduced by Hinton et al. as a method for
transferring the knowledge from a larger model to a
smaller one [164]. The notion of network distillation
was then adopted by Papernot et al. to defend against
adversarial attacks, also known as defensive distillation
[165]. The authors used the predicted labels of the first
model as the labels of the input sample to the original
DL model. This strategy increases the robustness of the
DL model to considerably small perturbations. However,
in a later study, Carlini and Wagner demonstrated that
their proposed adversarial attack (named as C&W attack)
evaded the defensive distillation method [166].
• Network Verification: The techniques verifying certain
properties of DL models in response to input samples are
known as network verification methods. The key goal is
to restrain adversarial examples while checking whether
the input satisfied or violated certain properties. In [167],
such a method is proposed that uses ReLU activation and
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Fig. 7: Taxonomy of Adversarial Defenses (Modified from [163]). Defenses are categorized into three categories: (1) Modifying
Data; (2) Modifying Model; and (3) Adding Auxiliary Model(s).
satisfiability modulo theory (SMT) to make deep models
resilient against adversarial attacks.
• Gradient Regularization: The idea of using input gra-
dient regularization for defending adversarial examples
was proposed by Ross et al. [168]. They trained the
differentiable models by regularizing the variation in the
results with respect to the change in the input due to
which small adversarial perturbations were not able to
affect the output of DL models. However, this method
increases the complexity of the training process by a
factor of two.
• Classifier Robustifying: In this method, classification
models are developed that are robust to adversarial attacks
rather than building a detection strategy for such attacks.
In [169], authors exploited the uncertainty around the
adversarial examples and proposed a hybrid model by
utilizing Gaussian processes (GPs) with RBF kernels on
top of DNNs to make them robust against adversarial
attacks. In a similar study, a robust model is proposed
for MNIST classification that uses analysis by synthesis
through learned class-conditional data distribution.
• Interpretable ML: It includes those methods that aim
at explaining and interpreting the outcomes of ML/DL
models for robustifying them against adversarial attacks.
An approach utilizing the interpretability of deep models
for the detection of adversarial examples for face recog-
nition task is presented in a recent study [170]. The key
aspect of this method is that it identifies critical neurons
for the individual task by initiating a bi-directional cor-
respondence reasoning between the model’s parameters
and its attributes. The activation values of the identified
neurons are then increased to augment the reasoning part
and activation values of other neurons are decreased to
mask the uninterpretable part. However, Nicholas Carlini
demonstrated that the aforementioned method utilizing
the interpretability of deep models is not resilient to un-
targeted adversarial examples generated using L∞ norm
[171].
• Masking ML Model: In a recent study [172], a method
for secure learning is presented in which the problem of
adversarial ML is formulated as learning and masking
problem. The masking of the deep model was performed
by introducing noise in the logit output which success-
fully deafened attacks with low distortions.
2) Modifying Data: It includes those methods that aim
at either modifying the data or its features, commonly used
methods are described next:
• Adversarial (Re-)training: This is a very basic method
that was originally proposed by Goodfellow et al. for
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making deep models robust to adversarial examples [98].
In this method, the ML/DL models are trained (or re-
trained) using an augmented training set that includes
adversarial examples. Various studies have used this
method for evaluating the robustness of DL classifiers
using different datasets, e.g., MNIST [173] and ImageNet
[167]. However, it has been reported in the literature
that this method fails to defend against iterative adver-
sarial perturbation generation methods like basic iterative
method (BIM) [174].
• Input Reconstruction: The method of transforming ad-
versarial examples into legitimate ones by cleaning the
adversarial noise is known as input reconstruction. The
transformed samples have no harmful effect on the infer-
ence of deep models. In [175], denoising autoencoder is
used for the cleaning of adversarial examples.
• Feature Squeezing: Xu et al. [176] proposed feature
squeezing as a defense method against adversarial ex-
amples by squeezing the input feature space that an ad-
versary can exploit to construct adversarial examples. To
reduce the available feature space to an adversary, authors
combined heterogeneous feature vectors in the original
feature space into a single space. The feature squeezing
was performed at two levels: (1) smoothing the spatial
domain using local and non-local operations and (2)
minimizing color bit depth. Moreover, the performance
evaluation of the proposed defense was performed using
eleven state of the art adversarial perturbation generation
methods using three benchmark datasets (i.e., CIFAR10,
MNIST, and ImageNet). However, in a later study, the
aforementioned defense method was found to be less
effective [177].
• Features Masking: The method of feature masking was
proposed by Gao et al. [178] that aims at masking the
most sensitive features of the input that are susceptible
to adversarial perturbations. The authors added a masking
layer right before the classification layer (i.e., softmax)
that sets the corresponding weights of the sensitive neu-
rons to zero.
• Developing Adversarially Robust Features: To develop
adversarially robust features, the connections between
the metric of interest and natural spectral geometrical
property of the dataset has been leveraged in [179].
Furthermore, the authors provided empirical evidence
about the effectiveness of using a spectral approach for
developing adversarially robust features.
• Manifold Projection: The method of projecting input
samples on the manifold learned by the generative models
is known as manifold projection. Song et al. [180] used
generative models to clean adversarial noise (pertur-
bations) from the adversarial images then the cleaned
images are used as the input to the non-modified model.
In a similar study [181], generative adversarial networks
(GANs) are used for cleaning of adversarial noise.
3) Adding Auxiliary Model(s): In these methods, additional
auxiliary ML/DL models are integrated to robustify the main-
stream model, commonly used methods that fall into this class
are described in the following paragraphs:
• Adversarial Detection: In this method, an additional
binary classifier is trained to distinguish between the
adversarial and original samples that can be regarded
as the detector model [182], [183]. In [184], a simple
DNN based detector model is used for the detection of
adversarial examples. Similarly, an outlier class has been
introduced during the training of a deep model that helps
the model to detect the adversarial examples belonging
to the outlier class.
• Ensembling Defenses: The literature suggests that ad-
versarial examples can be constructed in multi-faceted
fashion. Therefore, to develop an efficient defense method
against such adversarial examples, multiple defense
strategies can be integrated sequentially or in parallel
[185]. The PixelDefend method is an excellent example
of an ensemble defense method in which authors used an
ensemble of two methods, i.e., adversarial detection and
input reconstruction [180]. However, it has been shown
that the ensemble of weak defenses does not necessarily
increase the robustness of DL models to adversarial
attacks [177].
• Using Generative ML Models: The idea of defending
against adversarial attacks by utilizing generative models
was firstly presented by Goodfellow et al. [98], however,
in the same study the authors presented an alternative
hypothesis of ensemble training and articulated that gen-
erative training is not sufficient. In [186], adversarial
examples are cleaned using GAN that was trained on
the same dataset. In a similar study [187], a framework
named Defense-GAN is presented that is trained on the
distribution of legitimate samples. Defense-GAN finds
similar output during the testing phase without adversarial
perturbations that are given as input to the original DL
model. A summary of the state of the art defense methods
for making DL models resilient to adversarial attacks is
presented in Table IV.
C. Causal Models for Healthcare
Asking causal questions in healthcare is a very challenging
yet important approach and ideally, causal inferences require
experiments. But it in healthcare this not always possible, e.g.,
if we want to figure out what will happen if a person takes drug
A instead of B, we can not experiment it directly on the patient
which is unethical and can have unintended consequences.
Alternatively, retrospective observational data is leveraged to
train models for making counterfactual predictions of what
we would have observed if we had run an experiment [189].
Causality can be deemed in two foundational ways, i.e.,
potential outcomes and causal graphical models that require
manipulating reality. In predictive healthcare, potential out-
comes can be treatment, action, and interventions. If the total
number of possible treatments is T then we can have T
possible outcomes and the unit of observation will be a patient
who gets one of the T treatments.
In the literature, different approaches have been presented
for providing causal inferences and reasoning in healthcare
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TABLE IV: Summary of state-of-the-art defense methods for mitigating adversarial attacks.
Author Proposed Defense Methodology Attack Method(s) Dataset(s) Defense Accuracy
Gu et al.
[175]
Proposed the use of denoising autoen-
coders (DAEs) for removing adversar-
ial noise.
To construct adversarial examples, added ad-
ditive Gaussian noise into original images.
MNIST 99.1%
Xu et al.
[176]
Proposed feature space reduction
which is available to an adversary.
Evaluated the proposed defense against differ-
ent adversarial examples crafting methods.
MNIST, CIFAR-10, and ImageNet MNIST (62.7%), CIFAR-10
(77.27%), and ImageNet
(68.11%)
Gao et al.
[178]
Proposed the masking of unnecessary
neurons in the model.
Fast Gradient Search Method (FGSM) CIFAR-10 10% increase in accuracy un-
der adversarial attack.
Papernot
et al. [165]
Proposed defense distillation for im-
proving adversarial robustness.
Gradient based adversarial example generation
method.
MNIST & CIFAR10 2.56% increase in robustness
with distiallation temperature
of 50.
Garg et al.
[179]
Used spectral property for generating
adversarially robust features.
Considered L2 minimization based adversar-
ial perturbations.
MNIST N/A
Song et al.
[180]
Proposed to recover adversarial exam-
ples by projecting them back to the
manifold of original training data.
Evaluated five different adversarial examples
generation methods.
Fashion MNIST and CIFAR-10 Achieved the increase in accu-
racy under adversarial attack:
21% for Fashion MNIST and
38% for CIFAR-10.
Goodfellow
et al. [98]
Trained the model by adding using
both original images and adversarial
examples.
Fast Gradient Sign (FGSM) MNIST 17.9% fall in model error.
Metzend et
al. [184]
Trained a deep neural network (DNN)
for detection of adversarial examples,
i.e., binary classification into normal
and adversarial examples.
FGSM, BIM, and DeepFool. CIFAR-10 80% adversarial detectability
for all attacks.
Schott et
al. [188]
Variational autoencoder (VAE) for
generating clean images.
Used four different adversarial example gen-
eration methods that uses L2( = 1.5).
MNIST 80%
Ross et al.
[168]
Proposed input gradient regularization
for training a model that is resilient to
adversarial attacks.
FGSM, TGSM, and JSMA. Used three datasets, i.e., MNIST,
SVHN, and notMNIST
MNIST (100%), SVHN
(∼90%), and notMNIST
(100%).
using classical models. For instance, the Gaussian processes
based counterfactual causal model has been presented in [189]
and in a similar study, authors introduced the counterfactual
Gaussian process (CGP) for predicting counterfactual future
progression and argued that counterfactual model can pro-
vide reliable decision support [114]. The use of probabilistic
graphical models to analyze causality in health conditions
for identification sleep apnea, Alzheimers disease, and heart
diseases is presented in [190]. A comprehensive review of
graphical causal models can be found in this recent study
[191].
D. Solutions to Address Distribution Shifts
To cater with data distribution shift problem various tech-
niques have been proposed in the literature (e.g., transfer
learning and domain adaptation), which are described next.
1) Transfer Learning: The requirement of the availability
of a large-scale dataset for training DL models capable of
providing high performances can be partially mitigated using
transfer learning. Transfer learning is a technique in which a
model trained on a larger dataset is re-trained (fine-tuned) on
the application-specific dataset (relatively smaller in size to
the first one). The aim is to transfer knowledge learned by the
model from one domain (data distribution) to the other domain
[192]. However, transfer learning can be problematic for
healthcare applications due to the requirement of sufficiently
large data for first training and good quality data annotated
by expert clinicians such as radiologists for domain-specific
training.
2) Domain Adaptation: Domain adaptation is the method
of learning a DL model by considering a shift between the
training (often called as source domain) and test (often called
as target domain) data distributions, i.e., source domain and
target domain distributions are different. Domain adaptation is
a special case of transfer learning that can be particularly use-
ful for medical image analysis tasks such as MRI segmentation
[136], [193], chest X-ray classification [194], and multi-class
Alzheimer disease classification [195], etc. Different facets of
domain adaptation have been proposed in the literature and
can be broadly categorized as supervised, unsupervised, semi-
supervised, and self-supervised domain adaptation methods
which are described below. Please note that the definition of
domain adaptation is ambiguous since it may refer to labeled
data being available in the source or target domains and the
definitions provided below for each method are mostly used
in the literature [196].
(a) Supervised Domain Adaptation: This method is similar
to a supervised learning strategy with the only difference
of different distributions for source domain and target
domain data. Supervised domain adaptation is particularly
useful when a labeled data is available for the target
domain and generally, the source domain also has labeled
data.
(b) Unsupervised Domain Adaptation: In unsupervised do-
main adaptation, source domain data is labeled and target
domain data is unlabeled. An unsupervised domain adap-
tation method using reverse flow and adversarial training
for generating synthetic medical images is presented in
[197]. In addition, the authors used self-regularization for
preserving clinically-relevant features.
(c) Semi-supervised Domain Adaptation: In semi-supervised
domain adaptation, labeled source data and partial labeled
target domain.
(d) Self-supervised Domain Adaptation: Self-supervised do-
main adaptation methods aims at learning visual models
without manual labeling by training generic models using
auxiliary relatively simple tasks (known as pretext tasks).
The supervision is provided by modifying the original
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visual content (e.g., a set of images) according to known
transformations (e.g., rotation) and then the model is
trained to predict such transformations that serve as labels
for the pretext tasks [198].
E. Towards Responsible ML
In this section, we provide different methods for ensuring
responsible ML and we start by enlisting general responsible
AI practices.
1) General Responsible AI Practices: The following are
some recommended AI practices to ensure effective and reli-
able AI systems.2
• Consider human-centered design approach: To have a
large impact on the system being developed, it is impor-
tant to consider the characteristics of the users for true
recommendations.
• Evaluate training and monitoring using suitable metrics:
Instead of using multiple metrics for evaluation of model
training, ensure that the metric is appropriate for the
context and goals of the systems and consider users’
feedback in terms of surveys.
• Examine your raw data: The biases and abnormalities in
the datasets (e.g., missing values, class imbalance, and
incorrect labels) are directly reflected by the learned ML
models. To ensure the efficacy of the learning process,
careful examination of the raw dataset is necessary while
respecting the privacy concerns.
• Understand limitations of the model and dataset: It is
crucial to understand the capability and limitations of the
ML model and dataset, e.g., a model trained for detecting
correlations cannot be used for inferences.
• Repetitive Testing: Once developed, ML systems should
be tested again and again to ensure that they are working
as intended. Rigorous tests should be performed to under-
stand how the individual components of the ML system
interact with each other. Other similar tests include testing
for input drifts, using gold standard datasets, incorpo-
rating a larger sample base, and using quality checking
mechanisms.
• Continuous Monitoring and Updating: To ensure the
efficient performance of the ML systems deployed in
real-time settings, continued monitoring and updating are
required to identify and fix various issues encountered in
realistic settings.
2) Responsible ML for Healthcare: ML/DL techniques
have a great potential for clinical applications (e.g.,
radiologist-level pneumonia detection [11] and dermatologist-
level classification of skin cancer [13], etc.) but their limited
adoption in actual clinical settings indicates that these methods
are not yet optimal and not ready for clinical deployment. In
a recent study [199], Wiens et al. have provided a roadmap
towards safe, meaningful, and responsible ML for healthcare
and argued that ML deployment in any field should be carried
out by an interdisciplinary team that may include different
stakeholders from multi disciplines, i.e., knowledge experts,
2https://ai.google/responsibilities/responsible-ai-practices/
decision-makers, and users. Examples for an interdisciplinary
team having different stakeholders in the healthcare ecosystem
are presented in Table V. In addition, the authors also identi-
fied critical steps to be followed/considered when designing,
testing, and deploying ML solutions for healthcare applications
that include: (1) choosing the right problems; (2) developing
a useful solution; (3) considering ethical implications; (4)
rigorously evaluating the model; (5) thoughtfully reporting
results; (6) deploying responsibly; and (7) making it to market.
TABLE V: Examples for interdisciplinary teams having differ-
ent stakeholders from multiple domains. (Adopted from [199])
Stakeholder Category Examples
Knowledge experts
Clinical experts, e.g., radiologist and derma-
tologists.
Health information and technology experts
ML researchers, e.g., ML engineers and data
scientists.
Implementation experts
Decision-makers
Institutional leadership
Hospital administrators
State and federal government
Regulatory agencies
Users
Physicians
Nurses
Laboratory technicians
Patients
Caretakers, e.g., friends and family.
F. Tools and Libraries for Secure and Private ML
The main strength of ensuring secure ML relies on the
development of security tools and algorithms. To ensure the
security and privacy of ML models and data, various tools
and libraries have been released so far. For example, Ten-
sorFlow Federated,3 which is an open-source framework for
distributed ML/DL that enables training of a global shared
model in a federated environment without sharing clients’
local data. CrypTen4 is a framework for secure and privacy-
preserving ML built on PyTorch that provides secure comput-
ing techniques for ML/DL model training and inference using
encrypted data and PyTorch-DP5–a framework of PyTorch
for training DL models with differential privacy. Similarly,
OpenMined6–an open-source community offers various tools
and libraries for building privacy-preserving ML models which
are briefly described below.
• PySyft7 is python library for encrypted and privacy
preserving ML. It extends PyTorch, TensorFlow, and
Keras and supports differential privacy, federated learn-
ing, multi-party computation, and homomorphic encryp-
tion.
• PyGrid8 is a platform built on PySyft that provides a
peer-to-peer network to collectively train ML models.
• SyferText9 is a privacy preserving framework for NLP
tasks.
3https://www.tensorflow.org/federated
4https://github.com/facebookresearch/CrypTen
5https://github.com/facebookresearch/pytorch-dp
6https://www.openmined.org/
7https://github.com/OpenMined/PySyft
8https://github.com/OpenMined/PyGrid
9https://github.com/OpenMined/SyferText
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V. OPEN RESEARCH ISSUES
In this section, various open research issues related to the
domain of secure, robust, and private ML for healthcare that
require further research attention are presented.
A. Interpretable ML
Although the advancement in ML/DL research has provided
significant performance improvements over the previous state
of the art methods in terms of performance metrics such as
accuracy, precision, recall, and f1-measure, these advance-
ments have made the learning process of modern models very
complex and are usually deployed as a black-box. These black-
box methods fail at providing rational or insights as well
as at explaining their learning behavior and thought process
for making predictions [200]. The aforementioned problem is
termed as the interpretability problem of ML in the literature,
which is defined as the ability to describe the internal processes
of an ML system in a human-understandable manner.
Moreover, interpretability of ML/DL techniques is required
to ensure algorithmic fairness, robustness, and generalization
based on potentially dispersed data collected from a hetero-
geneous population. This can eventually help in the smooth
deployment and functionality of ML/DL systems in realistic
settings. For a critical application like healthcare, the ML/DL
model is expected to be highly accurate and understandable
at the same time. Moreover, it has been argued that clinical
integration of AI models will require interpretability [201]. To
perform an interpretation of ML models, questions about the
fairness of model’s predictions, transparency, and accountabil-
ity are considered and interpretation is performed using expla-
nation methods for justifying predictions of the model using
visual, textual, or features information. For instance, Bach et
al. presented a pixel-wise explanation method that uses layer-
wise relevance propagation for interpreting the predictions
of non-linear classifiers [202]. Similarly, for interpretation of
classifiers’ predictions, Ribeiro et al. presented a framework
named LIME and proposed two methods for interpretability,
i.e., learning a local model around the predictions and repre-
senting predictions and their explanations in a non-redundant
way using a submodular optimization approach. In [203],
the use of reinforcement learning (RL) is proposed to build
interpretable decision support systems for heart patients and it
learns what is interpretable to each user by their interactions.
One yet common method for interpreting/explaining deep
models, in particular, CNN is the use of saliency maps [204],
[205]. These methods are particularly focused on general ap-
plications, however, more research that is specifically focused
on the interpretation of ML/DL systems used in healthcare
applications is required.
B. Machine Learning on the Edge
The advancements in ML research have revolutionized tradi-
tional healthcare (as discussed in earlier sections). Healthcare
services will increasingly adopt the utilization of IoT devices
and wearable sensors in the future, particularly with the evolu-
tion of smart cities and portable medical devices, e.g., portable
MRI scanner. With such proliferation, there is a pressing
need for pushing ML models training and inference on edge
devices. This introduces unique challenges such as limited
hardware and processing capabilities, etc. Moreover, this is
crucial for portal medical devices that are utilized for patients
in critical care as they cannot be moved to fixed medical
equipment in the hospital. The research on enabling ML on
edge devices (a.k.a fog) is in the early stages of development
and requires further attention from the research community.
The development of this field will enable to monitor patients in
a critical situation and eventually enable continuous behavioral
monitoring for improving individuals’ life-style and timely
detection of diseases.
C. Handling Dataset Annotation
To increase the performance of ML/DL models, one natural
strategy is to acquire more labeled training data. This requires
that radiologists and medical experts spend their valuable
time manually annotating medical data, e.g., medical images,
signals, and reports. Another important aspect is devising
true validation sets that will evaluate the performance of the
ML/DL models and expose the limitations of these models.
Therefore, manual annotation of samples into respective cate-
gories is time consuming, costly, and a tidy process. Automatic
approaches should be developed to address this issue and one
such technique is active learning which can be used to annotate
unlabelled data samples.
Data from multiple sources should be considered when
performing annotation for specific clinical applications be-
cause single-source data might lack precise structured labels
[115]. The integration of multiple source data is an important
application of ML in healthcare [206], which is known as
phenotyping [207]. NLP techniques and recurrent deep models
can be used for extracting and integrating rich information
from unstructured clinical notes to augment the capacity of
data annotators.
D. Distributed Data Management and ML
In healthcare settings, the data is generated in a distributed
fashion, i.e., across different departments within a hospital and
even across different hospitals. This necessitates the efficient
management and sharing of distributed data for clinical anal-
ysis purposes, particularly using ML/DL models. In general,
for developing ML/DL models, it is assumed that complete
training and validation datasets are centrally available and
easily accessible. Therefore, there is an increasing demand to
develop methods for distributed data management and ML.
E. Fair and Accountable ML
The literature on analyzing the security and robustness of
ML/DL approaches reveals that the outcomes of these mod-
els lack fairness and accountability [163]. Whereas ensuring
the fairness and accountability of predictions in life-critical
applications like healthcare are of paramount importance,
the fairness property ensures that the ML model should not
favor certain cases over others. Such discrimination mainly
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arises due to biases in the training data. On the other hand,
accountability property is concerned with the interpretation
of the predictions. Fairness and accountability will assist in
developing models robust to biases and imperfections such as
past clinical practices
F. Model-Driven ML
Although ML, AI, and big data are immensely useful tools
for healthcare, these tools are not panacea and it is important to
be aware of the associated caveats and pitfalls [200]. Failing to
realize this, one can easily fall prey to the dangerous dogma
that data once available in abundance must and will speak
for itself and can handle hypothesis generation as well—
which in clinical terms would mean that data mining is suf-
ficient and independent of the need of clinical interpretation,
external validation, and understanding of data’s provenance
[208]. To avoid the various problems that can arise from
improper use of ML in healthcare, it is important to combine
data-driven methods with hypothesis-driven or model-based
methods (based on subject matter knowledge) and to bring
scientific rigor in these studies. Properly designed experiments
are also necessary for deriving causal explanations. Avenues
for developing secure and robust ML solutions for healthcare
that are scientifically robust and rigorous requires further
attention from the community.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The use of machine learning (ML)/deep learning (DL)
models for clinical applications has great potential to transform
traditional healthcare service delivery. However, to ensure a se-
cure and robust application of these models in clinical settings,
different privacy and security challenges should be addressed.
In this paper, we provided an overview of such challenges by
formulating the ML pipeline in healthcare and by identifying
different sources of vulnerabilities in it. We also discussed
potential solutions to provide secure and privacy-preserving
ML for security-critical applications like healthcare. Finally,
we presented different open research problems that require
further investigation.
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